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Abstract

With the D17 announcement, US-Cuba policies were suddenly and dramatically transformed after decades of
stale and repetitive relations. Guest editor Jorge Duany, director of FIU’s famed Cuban Research Institute,
invited a group of leading experts to examine the repercussions of the restoration of diplomatic ties and
discuss the intractable obstacles to the full restoration of relations between the two countries. Although
normalization of diplomatic relations and the prospect of change have produced an exciting time for
scholarship and policy analysis, the conclusion fifteen months later is that rapproachement has been slower
and more modest than expected.
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Dear Hemisphere readers:
As my colleague Jorge Duany indicates in the Letter from the Guest Editor in this issue of Hemisphere, prior
to December 17, 2014 (D17) discussion about Cuba and US-Cuba relations seemed, for the most part, stale
and repetitive. Not much new was worthy of reporting or analytical discussion. Cuba was not moving as quickly
as many hoped toward economic and social reform, and in the political realm, Raúl Castro’s Cuba was frozen
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in time. US-Cuba relations suffered from similar paralysis, despite President Obama’s policy changes in the area
of purposeful travel and some people-to-people programs. The incarceration of Alan Gross, the US government
contractor sentenced in 2011 to 15 years in prison for bringing satellite and communications equipment to
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members of Cuba’s Jewish community, and the continued imprisonment in the US of three of the Cuban
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intelligence agents known as the “Cuban Five,” posed formidable obstacles to any kind of rapprochement.
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With the D17 announcement, US-Cuba relations were suddenly and dramatically transformed, shifting faster
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than our ability to make sense of the overall impact on Cuba’s political economy. Normalization of diplomatic
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relations and the prospect of change have produced an exciting time for scholarship and policy analysis. Florida
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International University (FIU) is at the forefront of analyzing and engaging the process and impacts of this historic
development, across multiple disciplines.
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As the flagship publication of the Kimberly Green Latin America and Caribbean Center (LACC), Hemisphere
dedicates this special issue to tracking and analyzing the impact of diplomatic normalization on US-Cuba economic
relations, the Cuban-American community, Cuban nationalism and other important areas. I am grateful to Jorge
Duany, director of FIU’s Cuban Research Institute (CRI), one of the preeminent centers for the study of Cuba and
Cuban Americans in the United States, for putting together a superb lineup of scholars to examine the complex
aftermath of D17.
President Obama’s historic visit to Cuba in March 2016 was not the culmination, but an important milestone in
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what is to be a long but irreversible process that began on D17. It marked just one more step toward engaging and
empowering the Cuban people, helping change current dynamics and creating space for Cubans, as the president
stated during his extraordinary speech in Havana, to determine their own future. During the coming months and
years, LACC and CRI will continue to engage not only the scholarly and policy communities through their various
research and outreach activities, but also, through the Steven J. Green School of International and Public Affairs,
will partner with other FIU components to participate in the University’s goal of increasing ties with its academic
counterparts in Cuba.
Frank O. Mora
Director & Professor
Kimberly Green Latin American and Caribbean Center
Florida International University
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FROM THE GUEST EDITOR
When I came to Florida International University in August 2012, relations between the United States and Cuba
seemed frozen in time, still characterized by Cold War tensions. Since December 17, 2014 (D17), many pieces of the
puzzling connections between the two countries have shifted, some drastically, others more imperceptibly. On that
date, President Barack Obama announced major changes in US policy toward Cuba, including taking steps toward
reestablishing diplomatic relations, reviewing Cuba’s designation as a state sponsor of terrorism, and facilitating certain
types of trade and travel by US citizens to the island. On May 29, 2015, President Obama removed Cuba from the
US Department of State’s terrorism list; in July 2015, the United States and Cuba restored diplomatic relations and
reopened embassies in their respective capitals, and in March 2016 President Obama’s trip to Cuba marked the first
time in 88 years that a sitting US president visited the island. Journalists, pundits and academics rushed to analyze this
diplomatic milestone, portending a new era in US-Cuba relations.
Unfortunately, the practical outcomes of the US-Cuba rapprochement have been slow, modest and largely
unilateral. The two highlights of 2015 were the announcements of the resumption of direct postal service and,
eventually, commercial flights between Cuba and the United States. High-ranking representatives of both governments
have met several times to discuss matters of common interest, from migration and human trafficking to confiscated
properties and human rights. The US government has made extensive amendments to existing sanctions against
Cuba, easing trade, communication, travel, remittances and other financial transactions with the island. The Cuban
government, in turn, has insisted on four major conditions for “normalizing” relations with the United States: lifting
the US embargo, returning the US naval base in Guantánamo, repealing the Cuban Adjustment Act, and discontinuing
US broadcasting activities to Cuba (i.e., Radio and TV Martí). At the time of this writing (April 2016), serious
impediments remain to the full normalization of relations.
This volume of Hemisphere examines the numerous repercussions of the restoration of diplomatic ties between the
United States and Cuba. Among other questions, it assesses some of the intractable obstacles to relations between
the two countries, the economic opportunities created by an eventual lifting of the US embargo, and the potential
role of the diaspora in the future of the Cuban nation. I invited a group of leading experts on Cuban affairs from
various disciplines in the social sciences and humanities to reflect upon the significance of D17 for the two former
Cold War adversaries. Regrettably, I did not receive the contributions I requested from three scholars residing in Cuba
in time for publication. Nevertheless, the volume samples a wide range of opinions on the economic, political and
social consequences of the rapprochement between the US and Cuban governments. The result, I hope, is a balanced,
kaleidoscopic and insightful treatment of many of the difficult issues raised by the new US policy toward Cuba.

Jorge Duany
Director & Professor
Cuban Research Institute
Florida International University
Orlando Luis Pardo Lazo
6
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US-Cuba Economic Relations:

Opportunities and Challenges
by Carmelo Mesa-Lago

A

fter 55 years of hostility,
the announcement
by Presidents Obama
and Castro initiating
the normalization of
relations on December 17, 2014
(D17) opened an important and
positive new stage between the
two nations. The pronouncement
generated great expectations on
both sides for rapid and successful
progress, but was not grounded
on knowledge of extant and
future obstacles. Many journalists,
businessmen, relatives and friends
asked me about the imminent
economic boom in Cuba, the
reconstruction of Havana, the
huge profits that US companies
will accrue (McDonald’s will pop
up all over the island!), or how
to arrange a beach vacation in
Varadero. People thought that
Cuba was now fully unlocked for
Americans and virtually all assumed
that the Helms-Burton Act (referred
to in Cuba as the “blockade”) was
gone. Many well-intentioned friends
wrongly assured me: “Now you
won’t have any trouble attending
academic events in Cuba.” Although
many positive steps have been
taken, mostly on the US side, the
post-D17 dream will take a long
time to realize. This article evaluates
the potential short-, medium- and
long-term economic impacts of the
normalization process that began on
D17. It begins by identifying and
analyzing opportunities for both
sides in key economic areas, goes

on to examine the constraints and
challenges to a full normalization of
relations, and ends by inquiring why
economic results have been so slow
to emerge.
I. MAJOR ECONOMIC
OPPORTUNITIES FOR
THE US AND CUBA
Two well-known Cuban
economists have praised the push
toward normalization. According to
Omar Everleny Pérez Villanueva, the
results will be more in the mediumand long-term than in the shortterm, but will improve the living
standards of the Cuban people.
Ricardo Torres stresses the historical
ties between the two countries,
the fact that the US is the major
importer and technology leader in
the world, Cuba’s need for foreign
capital, and the importance of
Cuban Americans’ knowledge and
international contacts. The
most promising economic areas
are evaluated below.
1. Tourism.
Tourism currently accounts for
52% of total foreign investment in
Cuba. The effects of normalization
could begin to be seen faster than
in other sectors of the economy, but
the full results will take more time.
Cuba’s advantages are its proximity
to the US and its lure as “forbidden
fruit” following the 54-year ban on
travel to the island, prompting an
outpouring of interest in visiting
the island and a “discovery” flow.

Obama’s amendments to existing
regulations eliminate some red
tape and allow 12 categories of
travel, including educational,
cultural, sports, religious and
humanistic activities, family visits,
journalism, professional research/
meetings, and “support for the
Cuban people.” Major airlines plan
to fly to Cuba and travel agencies
are authorized to operate without
special license. A tour package for
one week costs about $5,000 per
person, with prices likely to fall as
competition increases. Travelers are
permitted to bring back $400 in
goods ($100 in rum and tobacco)
and can use US credit cards, with
no per diem rate (it used to be
$188). MasterCard, American
Express, Netflix and Twitter plan
to expand operations in Cuba, but
banking and telecommunications
are essential prerequisites.
In the first half of 2015, the
number of US visitors to Cuba
jumped 50% and a higher upturn
is expected for the entire year.
With a forecast of one to two
million US tourists, gross revenue
from the tourism sector should
increase from $3 billion to $4–$5
billion annually. Benefits will
mainly accrue to the state but
also to rentals of private homes/
rooms (which currently lodge
21% of all US tourists), paladares
(small, privately owned family
restaurants), taxi drivers and
tourist guides.
Hemisphere Volume 25
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2. Trade in goods and services.
The new regulations permit trade
relations (imports and exports)
with Cuba but are restricted to the
non-state sector: self-employed,
microbusinesses, non-agricultural
and service cooperatives, private
and usufruct farmers, and the
building and repair of dwellings.
US exporters/importers must
provide proof that their Cuban
partners are in the non-state sector.
The Cuban government demands
state trade without restrictions.
About 50 Cuban exports are
now authorized to enter the US,
including clothing, footwear, art,
cosmetics, textiles, jewels, leather,
furniture, bedding, mattresses,
clocks, musical instruments, movies,
wood, stone, paper, plastic and
rubber articles, ceramics, glassware,
cement, hats, umbrellas, toys,
machinery, electrical equipment,
vessels, and medical and surgical
equipment. Most of these goods are
not produced by microenterprises
and some not even by the state.
Also permitted are non-state
export services, e.g., hiring skilled
Cuban workers to carry out legal
activities, translations, bookkeeping,
software programming and language
instruction. One key question is
whether these goods and services
would be competitive in the US
market. Approved US imports to
Cuba’s non-state sector include
computers, software, personal
telecom equipment, animal fodder
and medicine. The only imports
permitted to the state sector are
food, animals, fodder and medicine.
A Freedom to Export to Cuba Act
introduced in the US Senate would
eliminate all trade restrictions,
but the Republican leadership
opposes it.
In 2013, Cuba imported $14.7
billion in goods, partly subsidized
and with credit, including $2 billion
in food to meet 70% of domestic
10
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needs. As of 2008, Cuba imported
$710 million in US foodstuffs,
making this country its main food
supplier and fourth largest trading
partner. US products are of good
quality, price competitive, and closer
than other providers (90 miles, or
2% of the 4,000 miles that stretch
between Havana and Buenos Aires
or São Paulo). The US Agricultural
Coalition for Cuba, the National
Corn Growers, and the Illinois Soy
Bean Association are all lobbying to
fully restore trade relations.
3. Remittances.
Current regulations eliminate
previous limits on non-family
remittances (which could be
invested in microbusiness). In
2014, about $4 billion in family
remittances entered Cuba,
representing 7% of the island’s GDP
and its second leading hard-currency
source. This figure will probably
increase in 2015, with the capacity
to boost the non-state sector. A
national survey conducted in Cuba
in March 2015 reported that only
11% of recipients of remittances
invest them in microbusinesses, but
70% said they would like to do so.
4. Oil and energy.
Cuba’s crude oil production
peaked at 3.7 million metric tons
in 2003, thereafter stagnated,
and in 2012 was 18% below the
zenith; natural gas output peaked
in 2007 at 1.2 billion cubic meters
and had declined 12% by 2013.
Causes of the fall were maturity of
existing deposits, stagnation of new
deposits, and Cuba’s cancelation of
exploration/production contracts
with two Canadian companies.
Spain, Malaysia-Russia, Venezuela
and Russia began oil exploration
in the Gulf of Mexico in 2012, but
these efforts were unsuccessful. In
2014, Cuba suspended exploration
due to previous failures and the

decline in oil prices, but Portfolios
of Investment Opportunities in
2014 and 2015 gave priority to
high-seas exploration and Russia
recently granted Cuba $1 billion to
try for the third time.
In recent years, Venezuela has
sent Cuba 105,000 barrels of oil
per day, meeting 60% of domestic
need. In 2007, the Cienfuegos oil
refinery, built with Venezuelan help,
produced 65,000 barrels a day.
Under the arrangement, Venezuela
exported crude oil to be refined
in Cienfuegos and Cuba sold
the surplus on the world market.
It’s not easy to assess if crude
exports have declined due to the
severe deterioration of Venezuela’s
economy, especially since any
decline appears to be offset by the
Netherlands Antilles; however,
exports of oil derivatives from Cuba
through third parties decreased
by one-third in 2013–2014, and
a petrochemical project with
Venezuela was suspended.
US technology and experience
would support oil exploration on
the high seas, on shore and inland;
increase extractive efficiency; and
postpone the depletion of deposits,
making Cuba more independent
of Venezuelan oil and diversifying
its investment and oil partners. But
first, the embargo must be lifted.
5. Nickel.
Cuba has the world’s fifth largest
nickel reserves. Production peaked
at 76,500 tons in 2001 but fell 11%
by 2013. Nickel is Cuba’s main
export but a decline in production
and world prices reduced its export
value by 29% in 2010–2012. The
island has four nickel plants, the
first two US-built: Nicaro (built in
1947 and since closed), and Moa
(built in 1957 and modernized/
expanded by Sherritt). The Che
Guevara plant, built by the Soviets
with obsolete technology, has been

shut down temporarily. The Soviets
also started construction of a plant
in Las Camariocas; after the Soviet
collapse, China pledged to complete
it but soon withdrew as well.
Venezuela currently has the project,
but the plant is not in operation.
The US has the technology and
capital to renew Che Guevara and
Camariocas, but current regulations
prevent exporting Cuban ore to the
US or investing in such facilities.
6. Agriculture.
In the last 55 years, Cuban
agriculture has had a dismal
performance due to excessive
centralization. Land is mostly
in state hands or controlled
by incompetent state-run and
-subsidized coops; farmers face a
lack of economic incentives; and
a highly inefficient state monopoly
has a stranglehold on purchasing
and distribution. Raúl Castro’s
structural reforms try to tackle such
flaws, calling for distribution of idle
state land in usufruct, increased
autonomy for coops, supply of
some inputs, and microcredit for
private and usufruct farmers. So far,
the reforms have failed to increase
agricultural output: the annual
growth rate averaged 1% in 2010–
2013, with production of most
items falling below 2005 and
even 1989 rates.
Official preliminary figures for
2014 boasted an increase of 13.3%
in agricultural output but significantly
underestimate 2013 production;
more reliable comparisons showed
a sharp decrease. The Minister of
Agriculture acknowledged that,
despite all efforts to improve output,
results were below expectations,
and agriculture’s contribution to
GDP was only 4%. Because of
the failure of agrarian reform,
Cuba now imports more than
$2 billion in food that could be
grown domestically.

Although Cuban economists
recommend giving priority to
investment in agriculture, only
4% of foreign investment is in this
field, and so far only one Brazilian
company has invested in the sugar
sector. Current regulations allow for
US export of tools, seeds, fertilizer
and other supplies, but only to
private and usufruct farmers.
7. Biotechnology and
pharmaceutics.
In 1986–1991, Cuba created and
expanded the “Havana Scientific
Pole” with significant investments
in equipment, technology and
expertise. The project encompasses
seven centers that specialize in
interferon and genetic crop
improvements; immunological
analysis; identification of congenital
deformations and hypothyroidism;
vaccines against meningococcal
infections and encephalomyelitis;
surgery/treatment of neurological
disorders (cerebral palsy, Parkinson’s
disease, multiple sclerosis, stroke);
treatment of brain diseases;
biopharmaceuticals for the treatment
of cancer and other non-infectious
diseases; and nuclear medicine.
In their early stages, the seven
centers generated substantial hard
currency from selling patents in the
US and exporting vaccines to Latin
America. In 1992, due to the crisis
caused by the USSR’s disappearance,
the Cuban government transferred
most of the centers’ revenue to
the state, returning only a fraction
and thereby dramatically reducing
their investment. By the first
decade of this century, some of
the centers were languishing due
to a lack of resources, poor access
to technology, and the brain drain
of technicians. Around 2013, the
centers were unified, leading to a
modest recovery. In the 1980s, Cuba
was a major medication producer,
but its success depended on raw

material imports from the socialist
camp. These ceased after the bloc’s
collapse, and currently the island
suffers from a severe shortage of
medicine. Exports of pharmaceutical
products—excluding medicine but
probably including biotechnology—
accounted for 5% of total exports
in 2013.
Under normalization, a mutually
fruitful exchange could evolve
between Cuban and US universities
and biotechnology institutes.
Cuban experience and knowledge
in biotechnology, neuroscience,
immunology, vaccines and other
fields would be beneficial to US
scientists and in turn, Cuban
scientists could gain from advanced
US technologies. Current regulations
won’t help in these fields because
Cuba’s centers are state monopolies
and exports and imports are banned.
8. Banking.
Almost all banking in Cuba is under
state ownership/management.
State banks collect people’s savings
and use them to give loans to state
enterprises and state-controlled
agricultural coops. Fifteen branches
of international banks provide
services to foreign customers (but
not Cubans), and loans to foreign
and mixed enterprises not eligible
for government loans. The poor
telecommunications infrastructure,
low quality of network data and
scarcity of ATMs are all factors
that restrict the banking system.
In 2008–2009, the credibility
of state banks suffered when the
government froze the bank accounts
of foreign investors and suppliers.
More recently, the government has
authorized self-employed workers,
members of new coops, private
and usufruct farmers to open
bank accounts. The Central Bank
is granting microloans, although
these are notoriously insufficient.
Current banking infrastructure,
Hemisphere Volume 25
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Cienfuegos, Cuba - January 20, 2016: In cities and towns all over Cuba, crowds of people gather in parks and public squares to access public Internet.
(TEKIN TURK DOGAN/iStock)

electronic equipment and personnel
are inadequate to meet the growing
demand for services. Cuba's inclusion
on the US Department of State’s
list of state sponsors of terrorism
also has caused Cuba enormous
difficulties in making transactions
through foreign banks; the US
imposed billion-dollar sanctions on
banks that failed to report
deposits and operations by the
Cuban government, making such
transactions a significant risk. Cuba’s
removal from the list of terrorist
countries in 2015 should alleviate
the situation.
9. Telecommunications.
Cuba has well-trained computer
professionals and Havana’s University
of Information Sciences enjoys good
equipment and Internet connections.
The lack of resources, however,
prevents the acquisition of equipment
12
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and advanced software, as well as
access to the Internet by the population
and companies. Cuba’s computeruse rate per 1,000 inhabitants is
one of the lowest in Latin America
and the Caribbean, at 5% (30%
have access to the state-controlled
intranet); the cost per minute is the
highest in the region and prohibitive
relative to the average national salary.
A recent effort has been made to
provide computers to schools and,
in March 2015, an agency opened
in Havana for public and officially
approved access to the Internet and
Wi-Fi, attracting a flow of eager
youngsters. The undersea cable
between Cuba and Venezuela, which
could expand Internet access and
speed, began functioning in 2013,
but only for government use. Current
US regulations aim to improve this
situation by promoting the export of
computers and telecommunication

equipment but require that the
Cuban government relax controls on
communications and the Internet
and permit foreign investment in
telecommunications infrastructure.
10. Infrastructure and housing.
Cuba has not repaired or expanded
its aqueduct and sewerage
infrastructure in more than half a
century, except in Santiago. Leakages
result in significant amounts of
water lost as well as a high incidence
of water-borne gastrointestinal
disease; potable water plants have
been cut dramatically and water
for human consumption must
be boiled. Due to an insufficient
number of collection trucks, garbage
accumulates in the streets, and
no processing plants are available
to turn waste into energy. Roads
and bridges are in bad condition
and transport is inadequate to

accommodate passengers and cargo.
Cuba needs to import construction
machinery and new techniques
to improve its infrastructure, but
current regulations prevent this.
In 1960, the government confiscated
most private homes, halted all
rentals, banned mortgages, stopped
private home construction and
impeded the buying or selling
of dwellings. Public housing
construction was grossly insufficient
to meet population growth and
many dwellings decayed due to
lack of maintenance, hurricane
damage and building restrictions.
The authorities approved private
housing construction in the 1980s,
but a severe shortage of building
materials resulted in a drastic fall
in production. Home construction
dropped from 111,373 units in
2006 to 25,037 in 2014, and units
per 1,000 inhabitants declined
from 9.9 to 2.3. Officially, the
housing deficit is 600,000 units
but my estimate is one million.
A 2011 law authorized home sales
and purchases, releasing capital
frozen for 55 years that can now
be invested to start a microbusiness
or change homes. Sales are only
3.6% of the housing stock due to
the population’s low purchasing
power (a cheap dwelling costs
$5,000, but the annual average
state-sector salary is $240,
meaning that it takes 21 whole
annual wages to buy a home), an
outdated property registry, lack of
mortgage financing, and excessive
bureaucracy (an application for a
home construction permit demands
procedures at four state agencies
and takes an average of 132 days).
New regulations seek to alleviate
the problem by facilitating imports
of construction materials. In the
March 2015 survey cited above,
41% of the respondents said the
US product or service they most
desired was housing.

II. STEPS AND CHALLENGES
TO FULL NORMALIZATION
Since D17, both countries have
reopened their respective embassies
and signed a maritime protection
agreement. The US has taken a
series of positive steps on its own to
accelerate the normalization process
and address economic issues that
benefit Cuba.
These include: a) Facilitating
American travel to the island;
b) Lifting the cap on remittances,
especially those for humanitarian
purposes; c) Allowing exports to
and imports from Cuba’s non-state
sector; d) Removing Cuba from the
list of state sponsors of terrorism;
e) Asking the US Congress to lift
the embargo; and f ) Introducing
a Freedom to Export to Cuba Act
in the US Senate that would
eliminate all trade restrictions
(the Republican leadership has
blocked it).
On the Cuban side, the measures
have been mostly political and
not always reciprocal: 53 political
prisoners have been freed, and
Raúl Castro has praised Obama
as a “decent” man, in contrast to
11 previous US presidents. Cuba
continues to demand the return
of the US Naval Base at Guantánamo
(this is probably negotiable but
is subordinated to a clause that
Cuba can’t rent the base to Russia
or China) and has cut imports of
US food and medicine. Castro
has also taken some antagonistic
actions: He failed to acknowledge
Obama’s positive overtures at the
2015 meeting of the UN Human
Rights Commission, which
overwhelmingly voted against the
US embargo; unconditionally
supported Venezuelan President
Nicolás Maduro in his conflict
with Obama prior to the VII
Summit of the Americas in 2015;
strengthened ties with North Korea
and asked the UN to eliminate

sanctions against that country; and
supported the Syrian government.
Normalization is further
obstructed by several factors:
1. Politico-ideological opposition
on both sides.
Cuba’s leadership is not united:
While some officials support the
opening, hardline opponents fear
that the end of the embargo would
eliminate a handy scapegoat for
Cuba’s economic problems or that
the flood of tourists could unleash
political and cultural trouble. Some
of Cuba’s actions actually provide
ammunition for US supporters of
the embargo. According to the
2015 survey quoted before, 97% of
Cubans believe that the normalization
process is good for the country. A
backlash could occur if the process
does not advance and people perceive
their government as the culprit.
In the US, a bloc of eight CubanAmerican members of Congress
oppose Obama’s opening and the
lifting of the embargo, including
Republican Senators and presidential
hopefuls Marco Rubio and Ted
Cruz, and Democrat Robert
Menéndez. Opposition in the
House of Representatives includes
Republicans Ileana Ros-Lehtinen,
Mario Díaz Balart, Alex Money and
Carlos Curbelo, as well as Democrat
Albio Sires. National surveys of the
US population, however, consistently
reveal widespread support for
normalization of relations with
Cuba and the lifting of the
embargo. FIU’s own polls of Cuban
Americans in South Florida have
similar findings; the latest, in
2014, reported 68% support for
the reestablishment of diplomatic
relations with Cuba and 52% for
lifting the embargo. Fifty-three
percent of registered voters said
they would support a candidate
in favor of restoring relations.
Hemisphere Volume 25
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Paladares or private, small, family-run restaurants are
now common across Cuba. Santa Clara's restaurant
El Alba cooks traditional Cuban food exclusively with
charcoal. (ROBERTO MACHADO NOA/LIGHT
ROCKET/AFP/Getty Images)
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2. Cuba’s economic capacity.
Cuba has a low capacity to sustain
trade with the US without subsidies
and substantial credit. Some
crucial facts:
• The US economy is 226 times
larger than Cuba’s; at 11 million,
Cuba’s population is comparable
to Ohio’s, but Cuba’s per capita
income is 10% that of the
US state.
• Cuba’s economic growth
in 2009–2014 averaged 2%
annually—in 2014 it was 1.1%,
ranked thirty-first among the 35
countries of Latin America and
the Caribbean.
• Gross domestic investment was
8.9% of GDP in 2013, compared
to 26% in 1989 (prior to the
“Special Period”) and 23% in the
rest of Latin America.
• Agricultural growth averaged
1% in 2010–2013.
• The deficit in the trade balance
of goods in 2013 was $9.4
billion, the second biggest such
deficit in Cuban history.
• The value of exports of goods
has steadily declined since 2011,
when it was already 12% below
1985 levels.
• Cuba depends on Venezuela
for about one-fourth of its GDP,
a dangerous figure because
of Venezuela’s dire economic
situation (200% inflation, a
projected 10% drop in GDP in
2015, and the worst economic
performance in the region).
Under these circumstances,
one would expect Cuba to do its
part to push for normalization
without yielding its sovereignty.
3. US embargo.
Since 1968 I have opposed the
US embargo on Cuba based on
arguments similar to those used
by Obama on D17. In addition
14
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to the Helms-Burton Act, the
Cuban Democracy Act prohibits
sales to Cuba by subsidiaries of
US corporations abroad, and the
Reform of Sanctions on Trade and
Exports Act bans travel to Cuba by
US tourists. The major economic
obstacle that Cuba faces is not the
embargo. The island maintains trade
with and investment from many
countries in the world. The embargo
does have a range of negative
effects, including cumbersome
foreign banking transactions, more
expensive US goods bought from
third countries and higher cargo
costs; however, Cuba’s inefficient
economic system and incapacity to
generate exports to pay for imports
are the fundamental hindrance.
Recent reforms have been positive
but slow, impeded by excessive
regulations, controls, taxes and
disincentives; so far, they have
failed to produce tangible economic
effects. Only the US Congress can
lift the embargo, and to date it has
ignored Obama’s request that it
take this step. If the embargo were
lifted, Cuba would receive many
more US tourists, and probably
credit, but it would have to honor
its commitments or credit would
vanish. Trade and investment
with the US would help diversify
trade and ease the island’s heavy
dependence on Venezuela.
4. Tourism.
Until recently, most US travelers
to Cuba had to go in groups with
an itinerary and a guide. Tourism
is not allowed, so the itinerary
cannot mix educational or religious
activities with a day at the beach.
Travel agencies and airlines cannot
sell tourist packages; violators risk
being fined. Individuals attending
professional meetings or conducting
research must have the credentials
for these activities. To attract return
visitors after the initial “discovery”
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flow, Cuba will have to improve
the quality of its hotel infrastructure,
services and amenities, as well as
reduce the cost of renting a car.
Cubana de Aviación will have to
upgrade equipment before it can
obtain permission to land at
US airports.
5. Trade and services.
Current regulations ban Cuban
exports of sugar, tobacco, rum,
nickel, antique cars, live animals
and animal products, vegetables,
prepared food, chemicals, vessels,
wool and cotton. Most of these
goods are only produced by the
state. Imports of US food declined
44% in 2008–2015 for several
reasons. First, the US does not
provide credit to Cuba, shifting
trade to Argentina, Brazil and Spain,
which do. Second, a stronger dollar
has made US goods less competitive,
and third, US tariffs are high outside
of trade associations. In the short
run, Cuba will have a significant
trade deficit with the United States
due to the little it has to export, a
situation that could threaten many
Cuban enterprises. In addition,
Cuba will have to compete with
Latin American exporters that
have a long relationship with the
US and preferential treatment
through bilateral and multilateral
agreements. To the best of my
knowledge, the Cuban government
has not yet authorized any US
trade with the non-state sector.
Particularly sensitive are imports
of communication and electronic
equipment. If trade is eventually
authorized, it will probably be
subjected to restrictions and
high taxes.
Cuba is a large exporter of
professional services, including
physicians, nurses and teachers. This
sector contributes about $5 billion
to the economy annually and is the
leading source of hard currency.
Hemisphere Volume 25
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Main buyers are Venezuela and
Brazil. Revenue from such services
compensates for Cuba’s deficit in
the trade of goods. Buying countries
subsidize salaries, do not scrutinize
training and credentials, and face no
language barriers. Shifting part
of those professionals to the US
won’t be easy.
6. Investment.
At less than half the Latin American
average, Cuba’s domestic investment
is low and restricts economic
growth, leading several Cuban
economists to argue for the need
for foreign investment in all sectors.
Officially, Cuba requires between $2
and $2.5 billion annually to jumpstart the economy into reasonable
growth. To achieve this, the country
implemented a new law on foreign
investment in June 2014. The new
law replaces regulations enacted in
1995; among other things, it:
a) Extends foreign investment to
all sectors except health, education
and the army; b) Exempts taxes
on personal income, the labor
force, customs for certain imports,
profits for eight years, and sales tax
for a year; c) Permits the opening
of accounts in freely convertible
currency at foreign banks;
d) Allows direct imports and exports
(the previous law did as well, but
in practice this did not occur);
e) Limits the period to authorize
or deny investments to 45 or 60
days (no limit existed before, and
the process often took years); f )
Authorizes enterprises with 100%
shares of foreign capital (this was
also in the previous law but the
state had 51% of shares except for
4% of total foreign investment);
g) Allows investments by “legal
persons” residing in Cuba as well as,
apparently, Cubans residing abroad
(although the latter is not clear);
and h) Offers guarantees to foreign
investors, including compensation
16
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in case of expropriation.
The law also maintains some
incongruous rules. It does not
permit free hiring of labor or
transfer of property. Foreign
investors cannot directly hire or
dismiss their employees, but must
instead go through a state agency.
Investors disburse salaries in hard
currency to the government, which
in turn pays a fraction in pesos
to workers (the exchange rate is
24 pesos to one US dollar) and
pockets the difference. Foreign
investments may be expropriated
for reasons of public utility or social
interest, and in several cases conflict
resolution has been left to local
courts instead of the International
Court of Arbitration. A survey of
businessmen in 2015 pinpointed
five factors that restrict freedom
to invest in Cuba: 63% identified
bureaucracy, 50% excessive
regulations, 43% legal procedures
and guarantees, 39% state enterprise
inefficiency, and 34% financial risks.
The latter concern was heightened in
September 2014, three months after
the investment law came into force,
when Canadian Cy Tokmakjian the biggest investor in Cuba - was
sentenced to 15 years in prison for
corruption and his investments were
confiscated. Five months later he
was deported.
A magnet for foreign investment
is the Special Development Zone
of Mariel (ZEDM), established in
2013. It offers better incentives than
the 2014 investment law, including
longer tax exemptions on profits and
sales, and a special labor regime that
allows agreements between foreign
investors and the state agency
on issues including wages. A 2014
decree stipulates that workers
receive 80% of the agreed wage,
at a preferential exchange rate.
In 2014, a portfolio of opportunities
for foreign investment listed 246
projects worth $8.7 million. It

allowed foreign investors to partner
with cooperatives but not the selfemployed, who account for 64% of
non-state activities. The portfolio set
25 priorities for foreign investment,
including 36 projects in hightech,
manufacturing and business
oriented to export in the ZEDM;
energy; and construction of two
cement plants and 12 new hotels.
A new version of the portfolio,
released in November 2015, identifies
326 investment areas and specific
priorities: access to advanced
technology, substitution of food
imports, expansion of exports,
tourism, energy, mining, industrial
infrastructure and biotechnology.
In March 2015, 120 investment
projects from China, South Korea,
Western Europe, Japan, and
Vietnam (including Toyota and
Hyundai) had been submitted
to Cuba, but no contracts had
been signed. The number of such
projects grew by 757% from
D17 to April 2015, but as of
November only eight agreements
had been subscribed.
7. US and Cuban claims.
Claims by US citizens for
property confiscated by the Cuban
government total $7 billion, in
addition to $12 billion in claims
by Cuban Americans. Cuba
recognizes US citizens’ claims but
rejects those of Cuban émigrés. In
turn, Cuba claims $180 billion in
reparation for damages inflicted by
the US embargo; the government
provides an annual estimate of these
damages, but many categories are
questionable, including the loss of
trade opportunities. A settlement
on mutual claims would probably
have to precede the lifting of the
embargo. Both sides could decide to
cancel their claims, but in that case
the US would have to compensate
the losses of its citizens. Other
alternatives include reducing the

value of claims to a portion of their
nominal value, Cuba waiving or
substantially lowering its claims,
and a debt-for-investment tradeoff
subordinated to the lifting of the
embargo. Cuba also demands an
end to broadcasts by Radio and
TV Martí; calls for rescinding the
Cuban Adjustment Act, which
grants asylum to Cuban émigrés
who touch US soil; and rejects
any changes to the political system
or discussions on human and
political rights.
III. GREAT EXPECTATIONS
AND POOR SHORT-TERM
ECONOMIC OUTCOMES
One year is not enough to assess
the outcome of normalization but,
as the previous analysis shows,
the initial great expectations for
a rapid and fruitful economic
rapprochement were not founded
on solid knowledge of the situation’s
complexity and extant barriers.
Despite Obama’s positive and
daring steps, the embargo is still
a formidable obstacle. The new
US regulations try to support the
non-state sector on the island with
more remittances and trade, as well
as promote wider communications
through electronic exports, the
Internet and “people-to-people”
travel. Havana has not given the
green light, continuing to pursue
its goal of state free trade with
and investment from the US.
Raúl Castro initially welcomed
the opening but has followed up
with antagonistic gestures that give
ammunition to active supporters of
the embargo in the US. His attitude
is also baffling in view of the
precarious economic conditions in
Venezuela, which contributes onequarter of Cuba’s GDP, and the lack
of other powerful nations willing
and able to replace Venezuela in a
worst-case scenario. With Obama’s
second term drawing to an end,

a narrow window of opportunity
remains to reach major agreements,
especially as no one can predict
the attitude of the next president
toward normalization. Raúl Castro
has announced his retirement in
February 2018; if the next person in
the White House is not as amenable
as Obama, there won’t be a chance
for Cuba’s leader to settle with
the US. Finally, the Cuban people
are overwhelmingly in favor of
normalization and, if it fails and the
leadership is perceived as the culprit,
a backlash is possible. The key
question, therefore, is: Why hasn’t
Cuba been more eager for an opening?
It is understandable that Cuba
wants to keep links with its allies in
Latin America, Russia and China
and avoid giving the impression that
it has capitulated to the US. But
some actions appear unwarranted,
such as the outspoken declarations
of support for North Korea and
Syria. Public repetition of demands
on the US could be explained as
bargaining chips but actually are
counterproductive; they fail to
move the process forward and
would be more appropriate for
the negotiation table.
Presidents Ford, Carter and
Clinton started negotiations with
Cuba under Fidel Castro, only to
have them aborted by actions that
torpedoed the process. I have shown
elsewhere that Fidel did not want a
thaw with the US because it would
mean losing key tools of the regime:
the enemy and the embargo. Raúl
is a pragmatist; he offered multiple
times to meet Obama and finally
reached an agreement with him
on D17.
The enigma of Raúl’s attitude on
normalization echoes his puzzling
behavior on structural reform, which
has been slow, contradictory, and
without tangible economic effects.
Plausible explanations include the
divisions within the leadership

and fears that reform will unleash
an unstoppable trend toward a
market economy and political
trouble that could destabilize the
regime. And yet, the alternative
is worse, particularly if Venezuela
should collapse. Cuba should move
forward with structural reforms
and rapprochement with the US.
Negotiations cannot succeed if both
parties do not give up a little, and an
unyielding attitude by one partner
could derail the entire process.
Carmelo Mesa-Lago is
Distinguished Service Professor
Emeritus of Economics and Latin
American Studies at the University
of Pittsburgh.
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New Policy, Old Politics:

Change and Changelessness in
US-Cuba Relations
by Louis A. Pérez, Jr.

A

momentous occasion
indeed: August 14,
2015, the raising of the
American flag to
  inaugurate the new
US embassy in Havana, something
of a mirror image of the raising of
the Cuban flag on May 20, 1902
to inaugurate the new republic. It
was very difficult not to be swept up
in the exhilaration of the moment,
and certainly not the time to allow
objective reality mar a subjective
mood: Just as May 20, 1902 was not
the day to dwell on a new republic
without the capacity to exercise
national sovereignty and selfdetermination, August 14, 2015 was
not the time to call attention to a
new US policy pursuing old politics.
The euphoria greeting the
US-Cuba rapprochement was
as widespread as it was widely
shared. “Historic diplomatic
rapprochement,” exulted The New
York Times, promising to lead to
“full normalization of relations.”
The restoration of diplomatic ties,
pronounced the Los Angeles Times,
represented a major advance in
“normalizing relations between the
US and Cuba.” Secretary of State
John Kerry heralded the resumption
of diplomatic ties as a step closer
“to restoring fully normal relations
between the United States and Cuba.”
These were promising months of
reconciliation after dismal years of
rancor, to be sure. But it is also true
that formidable obstacles remain in
the way of “fully normal relations
18
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between the United States and
Cuba.” Most immediately, the
embargo remains in place. Radio
and TV Martí continue broadcasting.
The 1966 Cuban Adjustment Act
remains unchanged. And, lastly, the
United States retains control of the
Guantánamo Naval Station, built on
territory seized in 1901.
However formidable these
obstacles may appear to be, they are
not insurmountable. Each could be
remedied and resolved through the
exertion of political will and the
exercise of good faith. The most
troublesome obstacles to “normal
relations” are not found in the
present, but in the past, over 200
years of history during which the
presumption of entitlement has
developed into the default template
from which US policy toward Cuba
is fashioned.
Cuba and the United States
moved toward rapprochement
within two different paradigms of
“normal relations.” The Cubans
engaged the process of normalization
within an explicit protocol of
mutual respect; in the words of
Foreign Minister Bruno Rodríguez,
“on the basis of respect and equality,
without any prejudice to the
independence and sovereignty of
Cuba, and without any interference
in our internal affairs.” The
Americans unabashedly pursued
“normal relations” as a matter of
instrumental purpose, as a means
to change Cuba, restructure the
economy, reform its political system

and reorganize the character of
Cuban society; that is, to do what
the United States has always done:
insert itself into Cuban internal
affairs to shape the course of Cuban
developments. “We would hope to
bring about change in the regime,”
Assistant Secretary of State Roberta
Jacobson acknowledged.
For a brief moment on July 20,
2015—the date that the United
States and Cuba restored diplomatic
relations and reopened embassies
in each other’s capitals—Secretary
of State John Kerry seemed to
have subscribed to the paradigm
of Cuban sovereignty and selfdetermination. “Cuba’s future is for
Cubans to shape,” Kerry declared.
“Responsibility for the nature
and quality of governance and
accountability rests, as it should, not
with any outside entity; but solely
within the citizens of this country.”
Sadly, Kerry’s statement did not
end there. “But,” he continued,
“the leaders in Havana—and the
Cuban people—should know
that the United States will always
remain a champion of democratic
principles and reforms… We remain
convinced the people of Cuba
would be best served by genuine
democracy, where people are free
to choose their leaders, express
their ideas, practice their faith…
where institutions are answerable
to those they serve; and where civil
society is independent and allowed
to flourish.” In tone and tenor, in
hubris and chutzpah, in the breezy

Secretary of State John Kerry (R) watches as Marines raise the American flag at the reopening of the US Embassy on August 14, 2015 in Havana, Cuba.
Kerry’s visit was the first by a US secretary of state since 1945 and a symbolic act after the two former Cold War enemies reestablished diplomatic relations
in July. (CHIP SOMODEVILLA/AFP/Getty Images)

way that self-righteous certainty
presumes selfless moral purpose—
“the people of Cuba would be best
served”—Secretary Kerry’s thinly
veiled rebuke to Cuba set the US
purpose in relief.
The “license” of power is perhaps
impossible to revoke; it informs
the very history from which the
powerful obtain moral validation,
from which the warrant of power
assumes such utter commonplace
normality as to take on the
appearance of the natural order of
things, hardly noticed at all except as
a confirmation that all is right with
the world. The sight of Assistant
Secretary of State Roberta Jacobson
in Havana in January 2015 engaged
in public sympathetic interaction
with Cuban dissidents could not
but give pause. One could only
imagine the howls of indignation
in the United States if an official
Cuban delegation arranged a public
meeting with representatives of
Occupy Wall Street. A similar
moment came in September 2015,
when, in summarizing the exchange

between Presidents Obama and
Castro at the United Nations,
the US press secretary related
that Obama had “reaffirmed our
commitment to seeing that the
Cuban government do a better job
of not just respecting, but actually
proactively protecting the basic
human rights of the Cuban people.”
No doubt an exhortation from
Castro that the US government “do
a better job” of protecting the lives
of African-American men from the
police would not have been received
calmly in US political circles.
US policy has been conditioned
by 200 years of history during
which the Americans have presumed
proprietary authority to manage
Cuban internal affairs, shape
outcomes and prescribe what “best
serves” the interests of the Cuban
people. Informing this stance is the
moral conviction that the United
States has the right—indeed, the
duty—to guide the affairs of Cubans
for their own best interests and that
the Cubans have the obligation to
accede to US guidance.

Cuba engages the United States
to defend historic claims to national
sovereignty and self-determination.
The United States renews relations
with Cuba to “bring about change
in the regime.” These two versions
of “normal relations” will be
difficult to reconcile and portend
the continuation of adversarial
tensions. Part of the problem is
that no usable models exist for
“normal relations” between the US
and Cuba. For nearly 200 years,
“normal” has meant a presumption
of US authority to impose its will
on Cuba. The historic model of
“normal relations” casts the United
States in the role of the arbiter of
Cuban destiny—always in the name
of what “best serves” the interests of
the Cuban people. Plus ça change…
Louis A. Pérez, Jr., is J. Carlyle
Sitterson Professor of History and
Director of the Institute for the Study
of the Americas at the University of
North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
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Diplomatic Normality
and Its Enemies
by Rafael Rojas

O

ne of the most
striking aspects of
the negotiation
process initiated by
the governments
of the United States and Cuba in
early 2015 has been its explicit
adherence to the realistic canon
of contemporary international
relations. Both governments, since the
concurrent statements by Barack
Obama and Raúl Castro on
December 17, 2014, agreed that
they would negotiate without
renouncing divergent principles that
put national interests above ideology.
The teams led by Vice Minister
Josefina Vidal and Assistant Secretary
Roberta Jacobson respected that
basic agreement, whose goal was a
theoretical consensus between two
states with differing ideologies.
The realist school of international
theory, starting with Hans Morgenthau
and his classic Politics among Nations
(1948) and rearticulated in the last
decades of the twentieth century
in the works of Robert Keohane
and Joseph Nye, was a doctrinal
current essentially linked to the
context of the Cold War. A central
motivation of Morgenthau, a
German Jewish intellectual and
University of Chicago professor
during World War II, was to explain
relations between states through
what he called “interest defined
in terms of power” rather than
the ideological confrontation that
monopolized the public sphere
during the Cold War. Echoing
Machiavelli and Marx, Weber and
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Freud, Morgenthau argued that
the reality of international relations
was hiding behind the façade of
ideology. Morgenthau, who closely
observed the conflict between the
United States and Cuba, especially
during the Bay of Pigs invasion and
the Missile Crisis, later wrote that
John F. Kennedy and Fidel Castro
had acted rationally according
to their respective interests. The
old master’s observation angered
politicians and intellectuals involved
in the ideological battles of the Cold
War. One of his critics was Maurice
Halperin, a former agent of the
Soviet NKVD and the American
OSS (the forerunner of the CIA),
who had advised Fidel Castro
and Che Guevara in Cuba in the
mid-sixties. After breaking with
the Cuban government, Halperin
accused Morgenthau of naivety in his
analysis, because it underestimated
the potential irrationality of an actor
such as Fidel Castro.
Like all conflicts inherited from
the Cold War, the dispute between
the United States and Cuba has
an ideological dimension that is
impossible to hide. One only has
to take a quick look at the domestic
and international policies of the
two actors in the confrontation
to appreciate their contradictory
global and regional strategies and
profiles. Ideology cannot be excluded
from the analysis of this conflict:
Not only do both states assign it a
central role within their policies but
also, after more than half a century,
their dispute has molded the values,

discourses, practices and even
temperaments of the
communities involved.
Despite the differences and
asymmetries between the two nations,
their governments have been able
to understand each other, restore
relations and outline a protocol for
diplomatic normalization. While
much remains to be done to satisfy
the central demands of each party,
the protocol itself is a major step in
signaling the willingness to negotiate
of two actors at odds for too long.
This progress is even more
notable when one considers that
the Cuban government is headed
by a historic leader of the 1959
Revolution and one of the main
architects of the Communist
political and legal system that has
characterized the island for the
past 55 years. This government
brokered Cuba’s inscription within
the Soviet bloc, radically changing
the hemispheric system and making
the island the target not only of
hostile policies of all kinds, but
also the closest approximation to
a nuclear holocaust in the West so
far. The state that was built after the
Revolution has produced a foreign
policy unprecedented in its global
activism among any Latin American
or Caribbean country, and Cuba was
the only socialist state within the
Soviet bloc to openly reject the fall
of the Berlin wall, the breakdown
of the USSR and the transition to
democracy in Eastern Europe.
On the US side, in contrast, the
negotiations were led by President

Barack Obama, toward the end of
his second term and with a polarized
Congress controlled by a Republican
majority. This ideological polarity
motivated America’s first AfricanAmerican president to rely more
on executive orders to reshape
US domestic and international
policy, as evidenced by such
examples as the Affordable Care
Act, immigration, the nuclear
deal with Iran, estrangement from
Benjamin Netanyahu’s government
in Israel and, of course, the
restoration of relations with Cuba.
Obama has pinned his hopes on
these initiatives as his legacy and
for his party’s chances for keeping
control of the White House in the
2016 presidential elections.
Despite the rational motives
of each actor, however, neither
is univocal and both are subject
to pressures and interests from
their immediate environment and
geopolitical partners. At least three
pockets of resistance oppose the
reestablishment of relations between
the United States and Cuba: (1)
Congressional Republicans, especially
Cuban-American senators and
representatives of both parties, who
are reluctant to consider constructive
ties with left-leaning Latin American
and Caribbean governments; (2) the
segment of the Cuban government
that is most resistant to change and
skeptical of the reforms Raúl Castro
has introduced over the past three
years; and (3) some currents of the
Latin American left, especially those
identifying with the Bolivarian
Revolution, which are not eager
to see an understanding between
Washington and Havana.
To understand these tensions, it
is useful to look back to the work
of Cuban philosopher and essayist
Jorge Mañach, who was exiled to
Puerto Rico in the summer of 1960
following his disenchantment with
the Cuban Revolution’s turn toward

Jorge Mañach, writer, scholar and statesman. (SERGE BALKIN/CONDE NAST/AFP/Getty Images)

Communism. At the University of
Puerto Rico in Río Piedras, hosted
by Chancellor Jaime Benítez,
Mañach delivered a series of lectures
on the Caribbean as a border
between the two Americas that later
appeared under the title Teoría de la
frontera (1970), a posthumous and
unfinished work prefaced by Concha
Meléndez. In these talks, Mañach
portrayed many of the protagonists
in the conflict between the United
States and Cuba as carriers of an idea
of the border as an edge or limit,
boundary or partition, when, he
suggested, it could best be thought
of as a “friction surface.”
Mañach was keenly aware of the
asymmetry between the United
States and its Caribbean neighbors.
The Caribbean islands, in his view,
represented an “uneven border.”
“When a village is underdeveloped,
as is now said, in the vicinity of a
powerful nation, or equipped with
different cultural elements..., the
border necessarily implies something
insecure and precarious,” Mañach
noted. When one abandons the
idea of the border as a “friction
surface,” he explained, countries
“lose the ability to communicate,
giving rise to arrogance on one hand

and resentment on the other.” The
function of borders in this context
is limited to “preserving as much as
possible the respective integrities,
enclosing the two human groups in
their corresponding places” (Teoría de
la frontera, p. 43).
Mañach cited the ideas of Argentine
economist Raúl Prebisch, the founder
of ECLAC, in suggesting that increased
economic activity was the key to
leveling the border: “studying our
natural resources, adopting modern
techniques and saving habits,
integrating markets, implementing
internal systems of distribution
and diversification of agricultural
property, and industrializing.
Above all, imposing on ourselves
healthy forms of democratic political
and social discipline.”
Today’s analysts may not use the
same terminology as Mañach, but
his idea of the border as a “friction
surface” remains a valuable lens for
viewing the challenge of diplomatic
normalization between the United
States and Cuba.
Rafael Rojas is a Research Professor of
History at the Center for Economic
Research and Teaching (CIDE) in
Mexico City.
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US-Cuba Relations:

Waiting for Real Change
by Nora Gámez Torres

A

year after D17,
President Barack
Obama explained the
theory behind the
change in US policy
toward Cuba, which had remained
almost untouched for half a century.
“Our original theory… was not that
we were going to see immediate
changes or loosening of the control
of the Castro regime, but rather that
over time you’d lay the predicates
for substantial transformation,” the
president said in an interview with
Yahoo News.
The results, however, haven’t kept
up with the enthusiasm generated
by the event, especially among US
entrepreneurs. Apart from Airbnb
and telephone companies such as
Sprint, few have benefitted from
the opening. Cuba’s removal from
the US list of state sponsors of
terrorism and the reappearance of
embassies in the capitals of both
countries are the results with the
most symbolic and political weight
so far. Cuba has made political
hay out of its removal from the
terrorism blacklist, but the United
States did not attain a comparable
achievement in 2015. According to a
State Department official I spoke to
via teleconference, direct mail, civil
aviation, environmental protection,
and the fight against drug trafficking
are all subjects on which agreements
have already been achieved or could
be achieved soon.
A day before the first anniversary
of D17, the two countries announced
an understanding aimed at the
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resumption of commercial flights to
the island, but acknowledged that
the negotiations will take months.
The talks have stalled over milliondollar claims in US courts to
compensate victims of the Cuban
government’s actions. An agreement
on compensation, rugged and
difficult though it may be, will be a
vital part of ensuring a real possibility
for US companies to invest and
operate normally in Cuba.
The island’s government has
yet to respond to most of the
incentives provided by the United
States. The Obama administration
has promulgated new regulations
authorizing US institutions and
companies to have a “physical
presence” in the country, open bank
accounts and hire Cuban employees.
In theory, US companies could
also begin exporting materials and
supplies to self-employed Cubans.
To date, however, the Cuban
government has not even opened a
wholesale market for small business
owners and continues to monopolize
all commercial activity.
For many US entrepreneurs eager
to invest, the slow reaction of the
island’s government seems puzzling.
Even one of Fidel Castro’s own
children, Alex Castro Soto del Valle,
has complained that the process of
change in Cuba is "too slow" because
of bureaucracy, the objections of
a “conservative” wing in the
government, and corruption.
On the US side, despite efforts
to lobby Congress, the embargo
and the travel ban to Cuba for

most US citizens remain in effect.
Nevertheless, as James Williams,
a lobbyist in favor of lifting the
embargo, notes, “while there are
still many challenges in relation to
US policy toward Cuba, we’ve
made more progress in one year
than in decades.”
Cuban Foreign Minister Bruno
Rodríguez has criticized Obama’s
measures as “very limited,” and
the government has made
ending an embargo a condition
of “normalization.” Even in this
country, legal experts such as Stephen
Propst point out that the Obama
administration could further expand
the categories of allowed travel
to Cuba and facilitate financial
transactions, among other measures
intended to relax the sanctions.
Obama might be inclined to do
so if, as he told Yahoo News, the
Cuban government accelerated its
own reforms. At the same time, he
seems to be taking into account
criticism from Cuban exiles and
members of Congress—above all,
Cuban American senators and
representatives—that his policy
offers an “economic lifeline” to the
island’s government. The president
has promised to be “selective” and
“cautious” in exercising his executive
authority to promote economic
change to avoid benefiting the
“cronies of the regime.”
The Island’s Political Climate
On December 10, 2015,
International Human Rights Day,
the Cuban authorities arrested more

than 150 members of peaceful
dissent movements. CubanAmerican congresswoman Ileana
Ros-Lehtinen—one of the leading
critics of the United States’ new
Cuba policy—took the opportunity
to reproach President Obama that
“countless economic and political
incentives have not stopped these
authoritarian people from clinging
to power,” a reference to “the Castro
brothers and their henchmen.” Cuba
remains a country of great contrasts
and no miraculous announcement
will change the island’s political
reality overnight. Obama himself
foresaw this problem from the start,
and reiterated in December 2015
that he will continue to “press”
to improve the human rights
situation on the island. Raúl Castro,
whom Obama described not as
an “ideologue” but a “pragmatist,”
although one “very committed to
the existing regime,” promised early
on to the Cuban National Assembly
that, during negotiations with the
United States, he would require
“respect” for the political system
established since 1959.
In sum, 2015 was a year with
“positive and negative results” for
the Cuban opposition, human
rights activist Antonio Rodiles
acknowledges. After freeing around
50 political prisoners earlier in 2015,
the Cuban regime continued to
arrest opponents on a large scale.
(As of November 2015, the Cuban
Commission for Human Rights and
National Reconciliation reported
7,686 arrests). At the same time,
however, dissidents have managed
to give visibility to their demands
through social media campaigns such
as #TodosMarchamos (advocating
for the freedom of all political
prisoners), #Cubadecide (calling
for a plebiscite), or the hundreds of
videos the Patriotic Union of Cuba
(UNPACU) posts on YouTube.
Rodiles has been one of the most

critical opponents of normalization
and has taken the opportunity to
express his views in Washington
at Congressional hearings. The
diplomatic turn taken by the United
States has created a clear distinction
within the Cuban opposition
between those who support the new
US policy and those who do not.
Who Wins the Game?
If this were a game of chess, the
Cuban government could be said
to hold an advantageous position.
It has secured the release of three
of its intelligence agents, who were
received back home as heroes.
The United States has removed
Cuba from its list of state sponsors
of terrorism, issued a series of
regulations to stimulate trade and
travel to Cuba, and expressed a
willingness to continue negotiations
with Havana on multiple issues.
Cuba has also drawn the attention
of the business community.
But an early advantage doesn’t
mean a solid position on the board.
The Obama administration has
a few months to make its legacy
“irreversible” and will demand more
than promises and meetings every
three months. The enthusiasm of
entrepreneurs could likewise fade
unless Cuba enacts the legal reforms
necessary to guarantee property and
investments, unify its currency and
allow the direct hiring of employees,
key concerns of the business
delegations that visited the island in
2015. It could decide to take these
steps, but some measures require
modifying Cuba’s Constitution.
Any transcendental policy change
would have to be approved by the
Communist Party, during its 7th
Congress in April 2016.
The end of 2015, with the
devastating defeat suffered by
Chavism in Venezuela, brought
great uncertainty to Cuba. If the
Venezuelan opposition, which took

control of the country’s National
Assembly, decides to cut back on
oil subsidies to Cuba, the island
could lose the equivalent of a quarter
of its economy and 35% of its
foreign trade, economist Carmelo
Mesa-Lago has warned. This could
accelerate the pace of reforms and
US rapprochement.
Obama raised the stakes in
December 2015 when he said that
he was “very interested” in visiting
Cuba in 2016, but only if the
“conditions are right.” Obama added
that he would like to see progress in
achieving “freedom and possibilities
for ordinary Cubans” and asked to
meet with dissidents and activists,
conditions sure to displease the
island’s government. Stronger
demand for human rights could
content the many Cuban Americans
who still mistrust the turn in US
policy toward Cuba, mostly because
of the scarce political results it has
achieved in this area and respect for
civil liberties. Obama only has until
the end of 2016 to prove that his
policy is not just a promise but rather
a risky bet with potential benefits
both for Cuba and the US.
Nora Gámez Torres has a PhD in
sociology and is a journalist at El
Nuevo Herald.

Hemisphere Volume 25

23

Reports

Reports

Ramón Cruz, who left Cuba three years ago, visits a Check Cashing USA store in the Little Havana neighborhood of Miami, Florida to send a $300
wire transfer via Western Union to his mother who still lives on the island. (JOE RAEDLE/AFP/Getty Images)

The Cuban-American
Community after D17
by Jorge Duany

T

he reestablishment
of diplomatic ties
between the United
States and Cuba has
raised numerous
opportunities and challenges for
both countries, including US citizens
of Cuban origin, particularly those
residing in South Florida. Here I will
assess some of the main economic
repercussions of the changes in USCuba relations for Cuban Americans.
Let me begin with some brief
background on the recent emergence
of a private, or non-state, sector of
Cuba’s economy, usually referred
to as trabajo por cuenta propia
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(self-employment). In May 2015,
the Cuban government reported
504,613 self-employed workers, or
approximately 10% of the island’s
labor force. Most of these workers
were employed in three service
sectors linked to the tourist industry:
paladares (small family restaurants),
casas particulares (bed-and-breakfast
rentals to foreigners), and private
taxis, including bicitaxis, cocotaxis
and almendrones, as Cubans call
vintage American cars. Other
authorized private businesses
include beauty and barber shops,
car repair, construction, and repair
of electrical appliances.

According to a 2014 survey by
Maybell Padilla Pérez, one-third
of the startup capital for these
businesses originates in CubanAmerican remittances, technically
defined as transfers of money by
migrants from the United States
to family members on the island.
Significant informal “investment”
(through remittances) is already
taking place in Cuba, but is not
yet officially recognized by either
the Cuban or US governments.
At present, small-scale Cuban
businesses, operated by family
owners, are the main target for
“investment” by Cuban-American

entrepreneurs. According to the
Havana Consulting Group in Miami,
Cubans living outside the island sent
$3.13 billion in total remittances to
their relatives back home in 2014.
Forty-eight percent of all Cuban
Americans interviewed in the 2014
FIU Cuba Poll sent money to Cuba.
According to Katrin Hansing and
Manuel Orozco, about half (47%)
sent money to Cuba by conventional
methods (i.e., wire transfers through
Western Union), while the other
half (50%) used informal means
(i.e., family members or mulas—
unlicensed remittance carriers—
traveling back home).
Cuban-American contributions to
Cuba’s economy are not restricted
to remittances. Cuban émigrés also
finance nearly 70% of Cuba’s cell
phone market, which amounted to
more than three million phones in
2015. Cuban Americans make more
than 50 million telephone calls per
year to Cuba, and Cubans living
abroad send millions of dollars in
packages, including food, clothes,
medicine and other assets. Nearly
half a million Cuban Americans
traveled to Cuba in 2013. They
took with them merchandise worth
millions of dollars, such as electrical
appliances, spare parts, and other
items used to develop and maintain
businesses on the island. When
Cuban Americans travel to Cuba,
they often stay in casas particulares,
eat in paladares, and purchase other
goods and services produced by selfemployed workers (cuentapropistas).
In short, Cuban Americans are
currently making a substantial
contribution to the development
of small private businesses in
Cuba and, therefore, to improved
living conditions for the island’s
population. Recent changes in USCuba relations are likely to expand
opportunities for Cuban-American
remittances, travel, communication
and investment in Cuba.

What is the potential role of
Cuban-American remittances in the
island’s economy? In 2015, about a
third of Cubans polled by Bendixen
and Amandi on the island said
they received money from relatives
and friends living abroad. Most
of the money Cuban Americans
send is spent on daily household
subsistence needs in Cuba, such as
food, medicine and housing repairs.
Some remittance recipients are able
to save a portion of the money and
purchase assets such as cell phones,
cars, machinery and computers. In
Bendixen and Amandi’s poll, 11%
of respondents said they invested
their remittances in productive
activities, including setting up and
sustaining small private businesses
such as beauty parlors, cafeterias
and cocotaxis. Many of the most
successful businesses in Cuba today
(including several paladares) were
established with dollars sent by
relatives living overseas. The money
is often used to purchase goods,
repair and remodel facilities, and
meet payroll demands. A 2011 study
by Orozco and Hansing found that
remittances financed 27% of the dayto-day operations of small businesses
in Cuba.
More broadly, the massive transfer
of money from Cubans in the
United States has a multiplying
effect on the Cuban economy by
bolstering consumer demand,
particularly in agriculture, retail
trade, communications, construction
and, more recently, real estate.
Remittances are now the second
or third source of foreign currency
on the island, after the export of
professional services and tourism.
They are part of a broad-based
transnational economy that operates
(largely informally) between Cuba
and Florida, including retail trade,
telecommunications, real estate and
many kinds of services.
The potential impact of improved

US-Cuba relations on Cuban
Americans depends largely on their
attitudes toward the restoration
of official ties between the two
countries. Several polls conducted
after December 17, 2014 have
documented that many, if not
most, Cuban Americans supported
reestablishing diplomatic relations
with Cuba. For instance, in a Miami
Herald poll published on December
19, 2014, 44% of respondents
favored normalization, while 48%
opposed it (with a 4.1% margin
of error). In a national US poll
conducted by Bendixen and Amandi
in March 2015, 51% of Cuban
Americans favored normalizing
relations with Cuba. Support for
reestablishing diplomatic ties was
even higher outside of Florida:
69%. In December 2015, another
Bendixen and Amandi poll found
that 56% of Cuban Americans
agreed with President Obama’s
decision to normalize relations
with Cuba.
The 2014 FIU Cuba Poll,
conducted in May 2014, found that
two-thirds of the Cuban-American
population in Miami Dade County
favored diplomatic ties with the
island. Several other significant
findings also emerged:
• Over time, more and more
Cuban Americans in Miami have
supported renewing diplomatic ties
with Cuba—from 20% in 1991 to
68% in 2014.
• Fifty-seven percent of registered
voters would likely vote for a
candidate in favor of replacing the
embargo with a policy of increased
support for independent
business owners.
• Fifty-five percent of the
interviewees would invest in
Cuban independent enterprises.
• Although split almost evenly
on the question of the embargo,
most Cuban Americans favor
unrestricted travel, remittances,
Hemisphere Volume 25
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Ñoooo Qué Barato! is a discount store in Hialeah, Florida and popular shopping
Reports
destination for Miami Cubans who buy inexpensive items to send to family and friends
on the island. Para Cuba Lo Tenemos Todo is their tagline. (JUAN MONINO/iStock)
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the sale of food and medicine, and
other kinds of trade with Cuba.
What legal and policy measures
might promote the participation of
Cuban-American businesses in the
emerging private sector of the Cuban
economy? An important first step is
for the Cuban government to clarify
the legal rights and obligations of
Cubans living abroad. The latest
legislation on foreign investment
in Cuba does not specifically
prohibit Cubans living abroad
from investing in the island (and
some Cuban officials have publicly
expressed that they would welcome
such an investment), but it remains
ambiguous on the issue. Cuba must
also provide stronger legal guarantees
for “foreign” investors (including
Cuban-American entrepreneurs).
Travel, visa and remittance
regulations should be more flexible
and less expensive. Cuba’s official
recognition of dual citizenship for
Cuban Americans would probably
facilitate their participation in
the Cuban economy. In addition,
experts have recommended that the
government authorize all economic
activities—including professional
services—in the self-employed
sector, and allow more employees
per business. In the political realm,
greater tolerance for diversity
of opinion and respect for human
rights in Cuba would certainly
encourage Cuban-American
investment in the island.
On the US side, lifting the
embargo of Cuba will be necessary
for a full normalization of US-Cuba
trade relations. This is unlikely to
occur before 2017, with Republicans
in control of Congress. In the
meantime, recent US amendments
to regulations governing trade
with Cuba have facilitated the
entrance of US (including CubanAmerican) businesses to the Cuban
market, especially in agriculture,
transportation, telecommunications,
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finance and even education.
Nevertheless, numerous legal and
policy measures still restrict the
flow of people, capital, merchandise,
information and technology between
Cuba and the United States.
To sum up, Cuban Americans
will probably be one of the key
social actors in the reconstruction
of the Cuban economy after the
restoration of diplomatic relations
between Cuba and the United
States. They are already sending
large sums of money, purchasing
goods, transferring technology and
consuming services in the private
sector of the Cuban economy. The
role of Cuban-American remittances
could be even more significant
in the near future as a source of
funding for independent business
growth on the island. In several
public opinion polls, most Cuban
Americans have expressed strong
support for the reestablishment
of US-Cuba diplomatic ties and
the expansion of the private sector
on the island. Maximizing the
potential contribution of Cuban
Americans to the Cuban economy,
however, will require substantial
changes to the laws and regulations
established by both the Cuban and
US governments, especially the
lifting of remaining trade, investment
and travel sanctions. Perhaps then,
economic exchanges between Cubans
living on and off the island will
become smoother and achieve their
full potential.
Jorge Duany is Director of the Cuban
Research Institute and Professor of
Anthropology in the Department of
Global and Sociocultural Studies at
Florida International University.
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Cuba’s Communist State Is
Now a Client of Its Capitalist
Entrepreneurs
by Tim Padgett

Future Cuban entrepreneur Mairene Valladares (right)
with a Welcome, Obama t-shirt that she and her
business-owner parents, Rubén (center) and Maida,
printed. (TOM HUDSON/WLRN)

R

ubén Valladares just
might be one of the most
important entrepreneurs
in Cuba.
No, he’s not a tourism
tycoon. He’s not a tech titan.
Truth is, he makes…paper bags.
“But we are the biggest provider
of bags in Cuba,” says Valladares,
a slender, middle-aged man who
finishes his sentences with the sort
of raspy chuckle that helps people
get through each trying day on
this island.
Valladares is especially proud of
the gift bags he made for President
Obama’s historic visit to Havana in
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March 2016. They sport Obama’s
face between Cuban and US flags
with a message in English: It’s Time.
Welcome to Cuba.
On the flip side is the logo of
Valladares’s packaging company,
Adorgraf, as well as an unabashed
commercial message borrowed
from the new normalization of
US-Cuba ties: “The First To Package
A New Relationship.”
Bags this nice don’t pay for
themselves, after all.
That’s the sort of business acumen
that changed Valladares’s life four
years ago. He was a middle manager
making a middling salary at a staterun Cuban firm printing business
cards. One day a shop owner picked
up his order and mentioned he
couldn’t find anyone in Havana
who could print his logo on sturdy
paper bags.
“That guy, he made the idea for
me,” says Valladares, who had one
of those capitalist epiphanies you
see a lot more of in communist
Cuba today.
A year before, President Raúl
Castro had expanded the range of
private businesses Cubans could
start. So Valladares and his wife,
Maida, launched Adorgraf making
personalized bags – with handles, a
deluxe feature in Cuba. (He makes
sure I see the winding yarn grips on
his Obama bags.)
The demand overwhelmed them –

and so did the money that poured in.
As in, 20% annual revenue
growth. Valladares recently bought
his family’s first car—a shiny pink
Russian-made Lada 1600. He has
almost 30 employees, most of
whom earn three or more times
the $20-a-month most Cuban
workers make. They also get benefits
such as family leave.
Adorgraf still has just a modest
workshop that sits on an unpaved
street near Havana’s airport. To
understand why the company is a
player, check out the wall inside,
where Valladares displays bags with
his clients’ logos.
“For example,” he says, “Caracol,
Gaviota, BDC International, Café
Escorial…”
Most of them are large, state-run
firms. And that matters a lot to
Cuba’s fledgling private sector.
Cuba today is home to half a
million private business owners,
or cuentapropistas. Not long ago
they were considered folks making
a few extra pesos in the island’s
threadbare economy.
But today they account for almost
a quarter of Cuba's economy and
employ almost a third of its workforce.
And the fact that the state is now
a cuentapropista customer means
that private ventures have assumed
a much more essential role.
“It’s an important psychological
step,” says Augusto Maxwell, a

Rubén Valladares points to one of the printed bags he has made in his Havana workshop. His private
company sells the bags to many Cuban state-owned companies. (TOM HUDSON/WLRN)
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Cuban entrepreneur Caridad Limonta (left) who owns a clothing firm called Procle
in Havana. Her son Oskar (right) will attend a business training course at Florida
International University this summer. (TIM PADGETT/WLRN)
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Cuban-American attorney who heads
the Cuba practice at the Akerman
law firm in Miami.
Maxwell was in Cuba in March
during Obama’s visit, and he says
a big question now is whether the
entrepreneurs’ new clout might lead
to more free-market reforms.
“That’s a conversation between
the Cuban entrepreneurs and their
government,” he notes.
And it’s not any easy one.
“Oh, it is very complicated for
us,” Valladares tells me with a more
exasperated chuckle.
So complicated that he has to
stop speaking English and explain
it in Spanish.
For example, he points out: The
Cuban government still won’t let
private businesses buy materials
directly from the wholesale market.
It’s a power thing. So when
Valladares needs paper from the
state-run wholesaler to fill orders
for bags, his clients have to buy
the paper first. Then he buys it
from them.
It doesn’t make sense in Spanish, either.
Which brings us to why Valladares
printed up all those bags welcoming
Obama, who is arguably the biggest
champion of Cuban cuentapropistas.
“Social responsibility is very
important,” he says, “but I think it’s
very important that we the private
sector push to change this situation.
Maybe Obama can help to change
this problem.”
In fact, Obama just took another
step toward that end. Only Congress
can lift the trade embargo against
Cuba. But last March the US issued
new rules that let private Cuban
firms buy and sell with America
and access credit there.
Maxwell says that puts the ball once
again in the Castro government’s court.
“We’ve created the infrastructure
that would allow them to plug into
our side,” he says. “Now it’s up to
the Cubans to figure out to what
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extent the Cuban entrepreneurs
can plug in.”
Entrepreneurs like Valladares really
aren’t waiting to find out.
And neither is South Florida.
That’s where Valladares hooked
up last year with a Hialeah printing
company, Florida Flex.
“We are importing from Hialeah,”
he says with a sly grin.
For months now Valladares has
been engaged with Florida Flex in
what cuentapropistas call Samsonite
importing: Bringing raw goods—in
this case, silkscreen printing ink
and equipment—from Hialeah to
Havana in bulging suitcases
and boxes.
Florida Flex, which is owned by
Cuban Americans, is also poised to
bring some of Adorgraf ’s employees
to Hialeah to train them in more
advanced skills.
It’s that kind of enterprising spirit
that keeps Adorgraf ’s workshop
humming. And it earned Valladares
an invitation to Obama’s event with
Cuban entrepreneurs in Havana,
where the President gave them a
pep talk.
“Cuba’s economic future,”
Obama told the entrepreneurs
assembled, “depends on growth
in the private sector.”
That seems as plain as a paper bag.
Tim Padgett is America’s Editor at
WLRN News. He has covered Latin
America for nearly 25 years and
received Columbia University’s Maria
Moors Cabot Prize for his body of
work on the region.
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C O M M E N T A R I E S
Gelato and a Balmy Evening Ride in an American Convertible:

To Be or Not to Be
in the New Cuba
by Ruth Behar

W

hen I first
started traveling
to Cuba in the
early 1990s,
the few tourist
stores had dark curtains in their
windows. They allowed only a
few people inside at a time, part
of a concerted effort to hide their
goods, suppress the desire for
the vast world of material things
unattainable to the majority, curtail
envy, and control the viral spread of
resentment. This tension is echoed
in the 1985 Cuban film Lejanía
(Parting of the Ways), by Jesús Díaz,
which portrays an exiled mother in
Miami who returns to Cuba after
a decade away. She arrives loaded
with suitcases full of clothes and
electronics for the son she left when
he was a teenager, but he refuses
to accept the gifts, finding her
consumerism repugnant.
I left Cuba as a child with
my parents and returned as an
anthropologist. I was in a strange
role, able to move between the
comforts of the emerging tourist
industry and the decaying socialist
sector that could no longer meet
people’s most basic needs. The
years following the fall of the Soviet
Union were a time of hunger and
scarcity, and I wanted to slip money
into the pockets of everyone I met.
But most Cubans back then still
believed in volunteerism, working
for the good of the people and the
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ideal of giving without putting
a monetary value on human
relationships. So I held back, not
sure whether to offer charity, fearing
I’d be taken for an obnoxious
returning Cuban flaunting
my privilege.
That era has ended for sure.
I traveled to Cuba several times
in 2015 to take the pulse of the
island in the aftermath of restored
diplomatic relations with the United
States. Havana’s José Martí Airport
is now barely able to handle the
numbers of US travelers passing
through, taking hours to transport
luggage to the carousels. Hotels
are packed, upscale restaurants
require reservations, and hipster
spots such as Café Madrigal, with
its exposed brick walls and edgy
art, are bustling. Vendors peddle
tourist tchotchkes on every corner
and street musicians sing the
“Chan Chan” song for a tip. Local
entrepreneurs sell services from
hairstyling to tutoring (the public
education system isn’t what it used
to be) to other Cubans. Stores are
stocked with everything from Nikes
and knockoff Dolce and Gabbana
T-shirts to toilet seats (in scarce
supply until now). Elders on the
street hawk a tube of Colgate or
a razor in its package. Those still
working at government jobs that
provide a free lunch will try to sell
their sandwich and soda for a profit.
This year, everything I’ve seen

and done in Cuba has become
part of a complex reckoning, a
need to respond to the question
everyone is seeking to answer:
What has changed in Cuba? But
a more personal question has also
haunted me: Who do I want to be
in the new Cuba? A few experiences
have left me uneasy about my own
participation in the Cuba that
is emerging.
One took place in a new gelato
place in the gentrifying Habana
Vieja zone, a crossroads of tourist
sites, galleries, boutiques, restaurants
and local residents with no running
water in their apartments. Helad’oro
is a private business that only accepts
the Cuban convertible currency
(CUC), pegged at 13% above the
US dollar. (Government salaries are
in the Cuban peso, and most people
earn the equivalent of $20–$30 a
month.) It offers gelato in flavors
such as mojito and pineapple. Prices
are less than you’d pay in Europe
or the US but expensive for the
average Cuban. On the day I was
there, a Cuban artist-friend and I
chose simple one-scoop cones and
sat down on the slippery new orange
plastic chairs. As we dug into our
gelato, we saw two boys, aged 10 or
11, their faces pressed against the
shiny glass windows, staring at us.
They were Afro-Cuban and clearly
from the neighborhood. A blond,
German-speaking tourist family,
with two children the same age as

Commentaries

the boys outside, also sat down for
gelatos. When they saw the boys
staring, they invited them inside and
offered to buy them a treat.
A male employee scolded the boys
for bothering the customers and
ordered them to leave. Apparently, it
was not the first time the boys had
begged for ice cream. The couple
purchased the gelato anyway and
brought it to the boys outside and
they stood eating it there until the
employee drove them off.
Ice cream is a political subject
in Cuba. The state-run Coppelia,
where the superb Tomás Gutiérrez
Alea film, Strawberry and Chocolate,
begins and ends, is a socialist ice
cream cathedral created soon after
the Revolution in 1966. An outdoor
pavilion surrounded by banyan
trees, it has the capacity to serve up
to 35,000 people a day. Coppelia
was a utopian effort to bring ice
cream to the people. If you’re
willing to wait on a long line, you
can still get affordable ice cream in
Cuban pesos, or an expedited line
caters to those who pay 25 times
more in CUC. In the early 1990s,
when milk was scarce and one meal
a day was all that most Cubans
could hope for, people would line
up at dawn at Coppelia to buy ice
cream for breakfast. A wide range
of flavors was offered in the early
days, when the Russians subsidized
the economy, but the moment
the Special Period hit Coppelia
was reduced to offering only one
“feminine” and one “masculine”
flavor, strawberry and chocolate
(thus the title of the movie). Flavors
to this day remain limited and
the quality of the ice cream has
deteriorated. Not surprisingly, a
reviewer on Trip Advisor raved
about Helad’oro and its “all natural
ice cream,” exclaiming, “Forget the
very low-standard Copellia” (sic).
Although the gelato was indeed

delicious, I felt sad consuming it
while the neighborhood kids were
being mistreated. It felt to me
like a portent of the times ahead
and the daily injuries of class
division and humiliation that are
spreading in Cuba, even as exciting
opportunities arise for those in a
position to benefit from them. I
am a child of exiles and can’t ever
forget that, but I guess a part of
me has always wanted to believe
in the ideals of equality and justice
symbolized by the Revolution. It
has been heartbreaking to observe
the disintegration of those ideals in
everyday life. How is it that Cuban
doctors have managed to reduce
infant mortality below US rates,
yet little boys in Havana still beg
for gelato? That wasn’t supposed to
happen in Cuba.
I had another uneasy experience
at the end of a week I spent with a
group of scholars and artists who
enjoyed seeing all the signs of the
cultural and artistic rebirth in Cuba.
On our last night in Havana, we
took a breezy ride in six classic
American cars, impeccably restored
convertibles painted in colors from
serene blue to flamingo pink. The
vintage cars seemed to have been
waiting all those years in Cuba just
so Americans would come back one
day and take a spin in them.
It was a perfect balmy evening for
a ride, but the thrill of being driven
around ocean-misted Havana like
a 1950s movie star died when we
passed a crowded bus station and I
saw fellow Cubans waiting to catch
a bus home for the equivalent of a
penny. They looked weary. I turned
away, afraid to catch their glance.
Moments before sunset, the
fleet of gaily painted automobiles,
sounding their singsong horns,
stopped at the Plaza of the Revolution
in time for us to see the outlined
images of revolutionary heroes Che

Guevara and Camilo Cienfuegos
burst into bright lights. It was a
beautiful sight, definitely worthy of
a picture. Everyone was snapping
photos. Soon I couldn’t help myself;
I did, too. Dutiful child that I am, I
thought of my parents: Would they
be upset? I wasn’t sure anymore to
which Cuba I belonged—the Cuba
of the people waiting for the bus;
the Cuba of exiles like my parents,
who’d left and didn’t want to return;
or the Cuba of people like me,
coming back with our privileges
and our nostalgia to see how the
island is changing.
Cuba’s independence leader,
José Martí, who spent years as an
exile in New York, once wrote that
he had two countries, “Cuba and
the night.” As we left the plaza
and drove on to dinner at one
of Havana’s most exquisite
restaurants, I found myself saying
a prayer under my breath: May
Cuba find its way through the
long dark night that lies ahead.
Ruth Behar is the Victor Haim Perera
Collegiate Professor of Anthropology at
the University of Michigan.
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Cuban Nationalism and the
Future of US-Cuba Relations
by Michael Parmly

Satirical cartoon in ‘The Verdict’ against Theodore Roosevelt and the Platt Amendment, 1899.
Library of Congress. (12/UIG/AFP/Getty Images)
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C

uba’s… geographic
realities give it
physical unity; the
absence of formal
impediments to the
spontaneous relations among its
inhabitants produces demographic
unity; the uniformed forces give it
police unity. From ‘colonial times,’
Cuba possesses unity in its traditions,
and the essentially common destiny
experienced by its various regions
affirms its historical unity. The
combination of those elements has
been sufficiently intense to give a
certain psychological nature to the
population that one can speak of
‘a Cuban character.’
This description, part of Antonio
Guiteras’s political platform for the
political organization “Joven Cuba”
in 1934 (quoted in Antonio Guiteras:
Su pensamiento revolucionario,
Havana, 1974, p. 183), is a useful
summation of a concrete reality.
Even today, Guiteras’s pronouncement
remains an accurate profile of the
island nation of some 11.2 million
people. Just last year, Cuban Foreign
Minister Bruno Rodríguez echoed
these sentiments at the flag-raising
ceremony at Cuba’s Embassy in
Washington, D.C., crediting “the
free and unshakable will, unity,
sacrifice, selflessness, heroic
resistance and work of our people,
and also the strength of the Cuban
Nation and its culture,” for making
possible that historic occasion.
The qualities lauded in both
statements are part of a rich cultural
tradition that can be traced back
at least as far as Félix Varela in the

early nineteenth century, through
Carlos Manuel de Céspedes several
decades later and José Martí at the
turn of the twentieth century, and
on to the present day. Something
had to account for Cuba’s ability to
maintain a separate identity during
the half-century when the US
dominated its economy and society,
and then the five decades of deep
hostility between the island and its
northern neighbor. The factor that
preserved Cuba’s independence, as
much as anything else, was
Cuban nationalism.
Admittedly, the term “nationalism”
can be controversial, evoking such
concepts as National Socialism
and xenophobia. To the extent
that nationalism is a belief in an
aggressive superiority complex,
or worse, racial antagonism
towards a country’s neighbors, that
opprobrium is justified. But a sense
of nationalism that contributes
to national unity, without an
antagonistic foreign antithesis, and
that helps energize a population
in pursuit of positive, constructive
objectives—an increase in wellbeing for the majority, or progress
towards legitimate foreign policy
objectives—represents a positive
factor in international affairs. In
its most strident form, nationalism
can be used as a sort of rallying cry
“to man the barricades.” In its more
benign form, however, it can be
a tool for governments to explain
the need for short-term sacrifice to
produce long-term benefits for the
population as a whole. The latter
description characterizes the type
of nationalism most commonly
seen in Cuba.
The components of nationalism
are multiple and vary with each
case (and for that matter, with
each historical era). History and
geography, demography and
economics, and culture in the
broadest sense—all are important

elements in explaining why a
population responds to and believes
in nationalistic stimulation. Most
important, nationalistic peoples
believe deeply in themselves.
Why was—and is—nationalism
important to Cuba?
Whenever a population lives in
the shadow of a larger neighbor,
that population seeks to ensure the
autonomy of its own identity. Since
at least the middle of the nineteenth
century, Cuba has been concerned
with preserving its independence.
A desire to dominate Cuba, even if
not the stated policy of successive
US administrations, was a fairly
constant theme of prominent
American politicians, from thenSecretary of State John Quincy
Adams and his 1823 comparison of
Cuba to “ripe fruit” ready to fall into
the lap of the United States, through
Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, who
wrote in 1895 that “the island of
Cuba… will become a necessity.”
In the first half of the nineteenth
century, slaveholding interests in
the United States saw the sizeable
slave population of Cuba as a logical
reason for coveting the island as a
further expansion of slave territory.
When most of the rest of Spain’s
holdings in the Western Hemisphere
won their independence in the early
nineteenth century, prominent
Americans—including many in
government—saw the moment
as propitious to try to buy Cuba
from Spain. The US insistence on
including the Platt Amendment in
the body of the Cuban Constitution
as a condition for withdrawal of
American troops at the turn of the
twentieth century served as further
confirmation for many Cubans of
the US desire to control the island’s
political destiny. Cubans had
good reason to worry about their
independence, and Fidel Castro’s
desire to break ties with the US
was a logical continuation of

that sentiment.
Cubans’ belief in a separate
identity continues to the present
time. Relations with Venezuela
became intimate at the beginning of
the twenty-first century, but Cuban
officials recoiled at the suggestion
that Havana “depended” on
Caracas. Cubans remain reluctant to
affirm that the evolution of Cuban
socialism should follow a Chinese
or a Vietnamese model. Above all,
most do not want to see a return of
the 1930s, ’40s and ’50s, when the
US dominated Cuban economic
and social life.
Raúl Castro would be well
advised to use Cuban nationalism
as a rallying cry to mobilize the
Cuban population to engage in the
major rebuilding that the island
so desperately needs. In Barack
Obama, he has an interlocutor
ready to respect Cuban identity.
Michael Parmly is a retired US
Foreign Service Officer who served as
Chief of Mission at the US Interests
Section in Havana, Cuba from 2005
to 2008.
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Cuba and the 2016
Presidential Elections
by Dario Moreno and Maria Ilcheva

T

he decades of
mutual hostility that
characterized the
Cold War between
the United States
and Cuba thawed significantly
on December 17, 2014, with the
dramatic announcement that the
two countries would reestablish
diplomatic relations. The surprise
announcement, which followed
18 months of secret negotiations
between the two countries, was
designed to create a new political
reality for Cuba policy for future
administrations to follow. To
achieve the diplomatic breakthrough,
Obama’s Cuba policy team not only
abandoned incrementalism but also
dropped many of the demands of
past US administrations regarding
human rights and democratization,
demands the Castros have repeatedly
rejected. By fundamentally
changing the relationship Obama
hopes to permanently improve
US-Cuba relations.
The president’s inability to get
Republican support for his Cuba
policy, however, may endanger its
long-term viability. US relations
with Cuba became an early issue
in the 2016 presidential election.
While the presumptive Democratic
nominee, Hillary Clinton, favored
the new policy, two of the Republican
frontrunners adamantly opposed
normalization. Cuban-American
senators Marco Rubio and Ted
Cruz, both strong early contenders
for their party’s nomination, pledged
to downgrade the US embassy in
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Havana to a diplomatic interest
section and restore tougher limits
on US government and business
dealings with the island.
Senator Cruz told Fox News host
Neil Cavuto that the rapprochement
with Cuba “will be remembered as
a tragic mistake.” He criticized the
decision as part of the larger failure
of US policy under Obama: “The
president believes appeasement
works. When it comes to dealing
with tyrants and bullies, whether it
is Russian President Vladimir Putin,
whether it is Iran, or whether it is the
Castros in Cuba, he believes that a
position of weakness is how we should
negotiate, and that doesn’t work.”
While Senator Cruz has been
outspoken in his criticism of the
president’s policy, Senator Rubio
consistently raised it as a campaign
issue. Cuba is an integral part of
Rubio’s world view and a hardline
foreign policy committed to the
restoration of US power and
influence. From his seat on the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
Rubio has been a powerful critic
of the president’s foreign policy,
opposing negotiations with Iran over
its nuclear program, pressing for
more support for the Syrian rebels,
and calling for increased military
assistance to Ukraine to counter
Russia’s influence.
Rubio clearly outlined his foreign
policy views and his objections
to the new Cuba policy when he
addressed the Council on Foreign
Relations on May 13, 2015.
Arguing that the new policy towards

Cuba would only strengthen the
island’s communist dictatorship,
he pledged as president to roll back
Obama’s concessions. Rubio said:
First, on day one, I will give the
Castros a choice: either continue
repressing your people and lose the
diplomatic relations and benefits
provided by President Obama, or
carry out meaningful political and
human rights reforms and receive
increased US trade, investment, and
support. Second, I will restore Cuba
to the state sponsor of terror list until
it stops supporting designated Foreign
Terrorist Organizations, helping
North Korea evade international
sanctions, or harboring fugitives
from American justice. Third, I
will do everything in my power
to provide support to Cuba’s prodemocracy movement, promote
greater access to uncensored
information for the Cuban people,
and deprive the Castro regime
of the funding for its repressive
security state.
Clearly, with Rubio in the White
House rapprochement with Cuba
would end.
Obama opted for a dramatic
and surprising rapprochement
because, given the sensitivity of
Cuba policy, his team believed
that any incremental approach was
doomed to failure. Although he
could not lift the embargo without
congressional approval, he used
his substantial executive powers to
undermine it. Executive action was
the fastest and only route for the
president to commence immediate

A couple watches TV coverage of a US presidential election in Havana. (STR/AFP/Getty Images)

policy changes, and with Congress
unlikely to take action he seems to
be seeking additional opportunities
to act unilaterally. At the daily press
briefing on November 4, 2015, State
Department spokesman John Kirby
confirmed that President Obama
was reviewing various “options” to
ease the trade and financial embargo
on Cuba through executive action.
Obama also made a historic visit to
Cuba in March 2016, the first by a
sitting US president in 88 years.
The Obama administration
recognized that a slow, measured
approach is likely to be overtaken by
events. Kissinger’s effort to establish
a dialogue with Cuba was disrupted
by the Angolan crisis in 1974–1975,
and Clinton’s “calibrated approach”
was interrupted by the Brothers to
the Rescue shoot down in 1996.
Incremental approaches also tend to
fail because they do not change the
fundamental relationship and are
easily reversible. In 1975, Ford lifted
the embargo on trade with Cuba by
subsidiaries of US corporations in
third countries; in 1992, the
Cuban Democracy Act re-imposed
them. In 1977, Carter lifted the
travel ban to Cuba; in 1982,
Reagan restored it. President Obama
hopes that fundamentally altering
US-Cuba relations will make
change irreversible.
As it turned out, however, Obama
underestimated the commitments

of the two Republican CubanAmerican senators to maintain the
hardline policy toward their parents’
homeland, as well as their political
skill in making the president’s
foreign policy easy political fodder
in the 2016 campaign. In response
to the announcement of the
thawing of US-Cuba relations,
Senator Rubio called Obama “the
worst negotiator that we’ve had as a
president since at least Jimmy Carter
and maybe in the modern history of
this country.” Senator Cruz called
the policy “disastrous” and accused
the administration of being “blind
to the fact that they are being played
by brutal dictators whose only goal
is maintaining power.”
The dynamics of the 2016
presidential race shifted attention
from Cuba to other issues of
importance to voters. In March
2016, Senator Rubio withdrew
from the race after losing the
Republican primary in his home
state, Florida, to Donald Trump.
As of April 2016, Ted Cruz is the
only remaining candidate who
maintains a hardline approach
towards Cuba. If elected, he has
promised to use executive action
to reverse Obama’s concessions to
Cuba, as other presidents have done
in the past, but the unexpected rise
of Donald Trump as the Republican
frontrunner and the increasing
likelihood that he will be his party’s

nominee make any course correction
on Cuba unlikely. In September
2015, Trump asserted that “the
concept of opening with Cuba is
fine… but we should have made a
better deal.” Trump has not revealed
specifics of this “better deal” and
has largely treated Cuba with
nonchalance during this election
cycle. In a 1999 Miami Herald
interview, however, he asserted:
Yes, the embargo is costly. If I
formed a joint venture with
European partners, I would make
millions of dollars. But I’d rather
lose those millions than lose my
self-respect. I would rather take
a financial hit than become a
financial backer of one of the world’s
most brutal dictators, a man who
was once willing to aid in the
destruction of my country. To me
the embargo question is no question
at all. Of course, we should keep the
embargo in place. We should keep it
until Castro is gone.
Given Trump’s vicissitudes of
opinions and rhetoric, the course he
would take on Cuba, if elected, is
anyone’s guess.
Dario Moreno is Associate Professor
of Politics and International Relations
at Florida International University,
and Maria Ilcheva is a Research
Associate at the Laboratory for Social
Science Research in the University’s
Metropolitan Center.
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Canada’s Island in the Sun?
The Impact of D17
by Catherine Krull

A

fter more than
half a century of
productive relations
with Cuba, Canada
can expect the
Obama Administration’s decision
to normalize US-Cuban relations
to have an adverse effect on its
interests. From both the Canadian
and Cuban perspectives, Ottawa’s
formal diplomatic connection with
Havana has been important. Canada
and Britain were the only powers
to recognize Fidel Castro’s regime
from the moment it took power in
1959. Despite periodic difficulties—
the 1962 missile crisis, the Castro
government’s Angolan intervention
in the 1970s, and the periodic
distaste of both Canadian Liberal
and Conservative governments in
the 1990s and 2000s for Havana’s
domestic human rights record—
Cuban-Canadian relations have
remained positive over the years.
Canadian anti-Americanism is
always just below the surface and is
one element of Canada’s desire to
pursue a sovereign foreign policy,
despite pressure from Washington
to support the Cold War embargo
and, after the Soviet Union’s collapse
in the early 1990s, the intense
economic warfare engendered by
the Torricelli and Helms-Burton
acts. Ottawa has opted instead
for a policy of “constructive
engagement” toward Cuba, based
on three pillars: 1) investments by
38
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Canadian corporations, chiefly hotel
companies and resource extraction
firms such as Sherritt International.
(Under the terms of the HelmsBurton act, Sherritt’s corporate
officers face criminal charges should
they travel to the United States);
2) trade (as of 2009, CAD$317.9
million in Canadian exports and
CAD$500.4 million in Cuban
imports); and 3) people-to-people
contacts. By 2013, one million
winter-weary Canadian tourists
had flocked to Cuban beaches and
cities and learned first hand about
everyday Cuban life. Conversely,
especially after the onset of Cuba’s
“Special Period” of economic
hardship beginning in the early
1990s, about 15,000 Cubans who
left the island settled in Canada,
precisely because it was not Miami.
Cuban émigrés to Canada often
perceive it as less racist—even if this
is not necessarily true—and more
liberal in its domestic social and
economic policies than the United
States. Normalized US-Cuban
relations will probably not have
much of an effect on the emigration
pattern of Cubans wishing to leave
the island for a new life in places
other than the United States, and
Canadian tourists will continue
going south. And Canada might still
have some residual political strength;
even the strongly anti-communist
Conservative government then in
office in Canada (under Stephen

Harper, 2006–2015) played a role
in facilitating the negotiations that
led to Obama’s announcement of
normalized relations.
In the short term, D17 will not
significantly affect existing Canadian
investment, trade and transnational
links. If anything, improved USCuban relations, a weaker embargo,
and market opening in Cuba would
likely benefit Canadian interests.
In the long term, however, as the
embargo disappears, Canadian trade
and investment will be dwarfed
by the much larger and powerful
United States as its agribusiness,
consumer industries and, perhaps,
banking and financial institutions
seek to recover ground lost since
1959. Politically, under the Liberal
government that took office in
October 2015, Canadian-Cuban
relations should remain on an
even keel.
For Ottawa, the main challenge
posed by normalizing US-Cuban
relations is the residual influence of
US cultural capital on the island.
Some Canadian universities with
long-established agreements with
the University of Havana have
already noticed a Cuban preference
for expanded agreements with US
institutions. In other endeavors,
such as medical research, Cuban
advances will find a larger and
wealthier market that goes beyond
Canada and the other countries
that have enjoyed a monopoly on

Cuba’s interest under the embargo.
Canada will find it difficult to
compete after full normalization as
easier access by Cubans to American
music, cinema, television and other
cultural commodities—and the
reverse, which will certainly include
increased US imports of Cuban
cigars, rum and music, plus the
appeal of sun-drenched beaches for
US tourists—cements US-Cuban

transnational ties. With memories
of its pre-1959 status as an exotic
tropical locale, Americans will
perceive Cuba as a desirable place
to invest, trade, visit and establish
exchanges of all types.
Cuban President Raúl Castro is
scheduled to retire in 2018, and
whoever leads the government
after that will need to devote more
attention to the United States than

to any other country. CanadianCuban people-to-people contact
will continue and, perhaps, expand,
but Cuba will no longer be Canada’s
exclusive island in the sun.
Catherine Krull is Dean of the Faculty
of Social Sciences and Professor of
Sociology at the University of Victoria
in Canada.

Mario Sanabria pushes his bicycle loaded with tourist trinkets through the surf of the Atlantic Ocean. Sanabria lives in Matanzas (a nearby city)
and hustles the Canadian visitors that flock to the resort area of Varadero. (CYRUS MCCRIMMON/THE DENVER POST/Getty Images)
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Cuba after D17
by Orlando Luis Pardo Lazo

Goodbye, CCCP. A quarter of a century after the demise of the Soviet
Union, its iconography continues to appear on Cuban streets. (Obispo
Boulevard, Old Havana)

The end of history. Slogans and car bodies converge in a parking lot
near post-revolutionary ruins. (Reina Street, Central Havana)

Socialism, sovereignty, independence. The dictionary of despotism in neo-Castrist Cuba conserves its candid calligraphy. (Miramar, Havana)
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Yankees, come home? In 2006, the Cuban government erected 140 flagpoles to obstruct critical
messages running on an electronic ticker at the US Interests Section. A decade later, neither the black
flags nor the ticker remains, and the US Interests Section is now the newly inaugurated US Embassy.
(Vedado, Havana)
Like a parody of the canonical cha-cha-chá made famous by the Aragón Orchestra: “The Americans have arrived,
and they come dancing with cash-cash-cash…” (Central Havana)
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A cobbler revolution. When a display of patriotic fervor is required, it’s almost impossible to find a
cheap flag that’s not sold in convertible currency. (Central Havana)
The art of waiting along Havana’s seafront has transformed into anxiety about landing. Granma yachts are
now cargo and cruise ships. (Central Havana)

McCastro self-employment. New Cuban entrepreneurs are more than willing to spur the battered national
economy...if they can survive the totalitarian obstacles along the way. (Miramar, Havana)
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Fashion’s own Bay of Pigs. After decades of censorship, US logos and flags have peacefully invaded
Cuban landscapes. (Central Havana)
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INSIDE BACK COVER
ADVERTISEMENT
From brainwashing to image-washing. The Cuban auto-transition from power to power may change its variables, but the equation will remain the
same. (Lawton, Havana)

Orlando Luis Pardo Lazo is
a Cuban writer, blogger, and
photographer who currently
resides in Reykjavík, Iceland,
on a fellowship from the
International Cities of
Refuge Network (ICORN).
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U.S. Department of State
Diplomacy Lab at LACC
Reaching Out Together to Bring Americans
into the World of Foreign Policy

Where?
The Diplomacy Lab at LACC is 1 of only 4 sites in the U.S.

What?
The Diplomacy Lab allows students to engage beyond the classroom,
develop new ideas and solutions to the world’s toughest challenges, and
contribute directly to the policy-making process.

Why?
Helps the U.S. Department of State tap into an underutilized reservoir of
intellectual capital and bring American people into the world of foreign policy.

How?
Faculty-led teams of students at FIU are focusing on anti-corruption
programs in Latin America and the Caribbean and the U.S. Department of
State is channeling those findings directly into policy-making.

state.gov/s/sacsed/diplomacylab
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Forging Linkages across the Americas through education, research, outreach, and dialogue.

